Competition between collective and individual dynamics by Grauwin, Sébastian et al.
Competition between collective and individual
dynamics
Se´bastian Grauwin ∗ †, Eric Bertin ∗ † , Re´mi Lemoy † ‡, and Pablo Jensen ∗ † ‡ §
∗Universite´ de Lyon, Laboratoire de Physique,ENS Lyon and CNRS, 46 alle´e d’Italie, F-69007 Lyon, France ,†IXXI, 5 rue du Vercors, F-69007 Lyon, France,‡Laboratoire
d’Economie des Transports,Universite´ Lyon 2 and CNRS, 14, av. Berthelot F-69007 Lyon, France, and §To whom correspondence should be addressed; E-mail: pablo.jensen@ens-
lyon.fr
Submitted to Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
Linking the microscopic and macroscopic behavior is at the heart of
many natural and social sciences. This apparent similarity conceals
essential differences across disciplines: while physical particles are
assumed to optimize the global energy, economic agents maximize
their own utility. Here, we solve exactly a Schelling-like segregation
model, which interpolates continuously between cooperative and in-
dividual dynamics. We show that increasing the degree of cooper-
ativity induces a qualitative transition from a segregated phase of
low utility towards a mixed phase of high utility. By introducing a
simple function which links the individual and global levels, we pave
the way to a rigorous approach of a wide class of systems, where
dynamics is governed by individual strategies.
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The intricate relations between the individual and collec-
tive levels are at the heart of many natural and social sciences.
Different disciplines wonder how atoms combine to form solids
[1, 2], neurons give rise to consciousness [3, 4] or individuals
shape markets and societies [5, 6, 7]. However, scientific fields
assume distinct points of view for defining the ”normal”, or
”equilibrium” aggregated state. Physics looks at the collec-
tive level, selecting the configurations that minimize the global
free energy [2]. In contrast, economic agents behave in a selfish
way, and equilibrium is attained when no agent can increase
its own satisfaction [8]. Although similar at first sight, the
two approaches lead to radically different outcomes, and the
selfish strategy may prove dramatically inefficient in presence
of interactions between agents. We illustrate this effect on
an exactly solvable model, similar to Schelling’s segregation
model [9]. Considering individual agents which prefer a mixed
environment, we study the segregated or mixed patterns that
emerge at the global level. A ”tax” parameter monitors con-
tinuously the agents’ degree of altruism or cooperativity, i.e.,
their consideration of the global welfare. At low degrees of
cooperativity, segregation occurs and the agents’ utilities re-
main low, in spite of continuous efforts to maximize their sat-
isfaction. As the altruism parameter is increased, a phase
transition occurs, driving the system towards a mixed phase
of maximal utility. Our approach generalizes the free energy
function used in physics, allowing to predict analytically the
stationary states, which required so far numerical simulations
[10].
Model
Our model represents in a schematic way the dynamics of res-
idential moves in a city. For simplicity, we include one type of
agent, but our results can readily be generalized to deal with
agents of two ”colors”, as in the original Schelling model [9]
(see below). The city is divided into Q blocks (Q >> 1), each
block containingH cells or flats (Fig. 1). We assume that each
cell can contain at most one agent, so that the number nq of
agents in a given block q (q = 1, . . . , Q) satisfies nq ≤ H, and
we introduce the density of agents ρq = nq/H. Each agent
has the same utility function u(ρq), which describes the degree
of satisfaction concerning the density of the block it is living
in. The collective utility is defined as the total utility of all
the agents in the city: U(x) = H
P
q ρqu(ρq), where x ≡ {ρq}
corresponds to the coarse-grained configuration of the city,
i.e. the knowledge of the density of each block. For a given x,
there is a large number of ways to arrange the agents in the
different cells. This number of arrangements is quantified by
its logarithm S(x), called the entropy of the configuration x.
The dynamical rule allowing the agents to move from one
block to another is the following. At each time step, one picks
up at random an agent and a vacant cell, within two differ-
ent blocks. Then the agent moves in that empty cell with
probability:
Pxy =
1
1 + e−C/T
, [1]
where x and y are respectively the configurations before and
after the move, and C is the cost associated to the proposed
move. The positive parameter T is a ”temperature” which
introduces in a standard way [11] some noise on the decision
process. It can be interpreted as the effect of features that are
not explicitely included in the utility function but still affect
the moving decision (urban facilities, friends. . . ). We write
the cost C as :
C = ∆u+ α(∆U −∆u) [2]
where ∆u is the variation of the agent’s own utility upon mov-
ing and ∆U is the variation of the total utility of all agents.
The parameter 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 weights the contribution of the
other agents’ utility variation in the calculation of the cost C,
and it can thus be interpreted as a degree of cooperativity (or
altruism). For α = 0, the probability to move only depends
on the selfish interest of the chosen agent, while for α = 1
it only depends on the collective utility. Varying α in a con-
tinuous way, one can interpolate between these two limiting
behaviors.
Potential function
We wish to find the stationary probability distribution Π(x)
of the microscopic configurations x. If the cost C can be writ-
ten as C = ∆V ≡ V (y)−V (x), where V (x) is a function of the
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configuration x, then the dynamics satisfies detailed balance
[12] and the distribution Π(x) is given by
Π(x) =
1
Z
eF (x)/T , [3]
with F (x) = V (x) + TS(x) and Z a normalization con-
stant. The entropy has for large H the standard expression
S(x) = H
P
q s(ρq), with
s(ρ) = −ρ ln ρ− (1− ρ) ln(1− ρ). [4]
We now need to find the function V (x), if it exists. Given
the form (2) of C, finding such a function V (x) amounts to
finding a ”linking” function L(x), connecting the individual
and collective levels, such that ∆u = ∆L. By analogy to the
entropy, we assume that L(x) can be written as a sum over the
blocks, namely L(x) = H
P
q `(ρq). Considering a move from
a block at density ρ1 to a block at density ρ2, ∆L reduces in
the large H limit to `′(ρ2)− `′(ρ1), where `′ is the derivative
of `. The condition ∆u = ∆L then leads to the identification
`′(ρ) = u(ρ), from which the expression of `(ρ) follows:
`(ρ) =
Z ρ
0
u(ρ′)dρ′. [5]
As a result, the function F (x) can be expressed in the large
H limit as F (x) = H
P
q f(ρq), with a block potential f(ρ)
given by :
f(ρ) = −Tρ ln ρ− T (1− ρ) ln(1− ρ)
+ αρu(ρ) + (1− α)
Z ρ
0
u(ρ′)dρ′. [6]
The probability Π(x) is dominated by the configurations
x = {ρq} that maximize the sum Pq f(ρq) under the con-
straint of a fixed ρ0 = 1/Q
PQ
q=1 ρq. To perform this maxi-
mization procedure, we follow standard physics methods used
in the study of phase transitions (like liquid-vapor coexistence
[13]), which can be summarized as follows. If f(ρ) coincides
with its concave hull at a given density ρ0, then the state of the
city is homogeneous, and all blocks have a density ρ0. Other-
wise, a phase separation occurs: some blocks have a density
ρ∗1 < ρ0, while the others have a density ρ
∗
2 > ρ0.
Interestingly, the potential F can be calculated for arbi-
trary utility functions. It generalizes the free energy function
used in physics, allowing to predict analytically the global
town state. Such an achievement eluded so far individualis-
tic, Schelling-type models, which had to be solved through
numerical simulations [10].
To obtain explicitly the equilibrium configurations, one
needs to know the specific form of the utility function. To
illustrate the dramatic influence of the cooperativity parame-
ter α, we use the asymmetrically peaked utility function [14],
which indicates that agents prefer mixed blocks (Figure 2).
The overall town density is fixed at ρ0 = 1/2 to avoid the
trivial utility frustration resulting from the impossibility to
attain the optimal equilibrium (ρq = 1/2 for all blocks). The
qualitative behavior of the system is unchanged for ρ0 6= 1/2
or for low values of the temperature.
In the collective case (α = 1), the optimal state corre-
sponds to the configuration that maximizes the global util-
ity, which can be immediately guessed from Figure 2, namely
ρq = 1/2 for all q (Fig 1a). On the contrary, in the selfish case
(α = 0, Fig 1b), maximization of the potential F (x) shows
that the town settles in a segregated configuration where a
fraction of the blocks are empty and the others have a density
ρs > 1/2. Surprisingly, the city settles in this state of low
utility in spite of agents’ continuous efforts to maximize their
own satisfaction. To understand this frustrated configuration,
note that the collective equilibrium (ρq = 1/2 for all q) is now
an unstable Nash equilibrium at T > 0. The instability can
be understood by noting that at T > 0 there is a positive
probability that an agent accepts a slight decrease of its util-
ity, and leaves a block with density ρq = 1/2. The agents
remaining in its former block now have a lower utility and are
more likely to leave. This creates an avalanche which empties
the block, as each move away further decreases the utility of
the remaining agents.
Mixed and segregated states are separated by a phase
transition at the critical value αc = 1/(3 − 2m) (Figure 3).
This transition differs from standard equilibrium phase tran-
sitions known in physics, which are most often driven by the
competition between energy and entropy. Here, the transition
is driven by a competition between the collective and individ-
ual components of the agents’ dynamics. The unsatisfactory
global state of the city can be interpreted, from the economics’
point of view, as an effect of externalities: by moving to in-
crease its utility, an agent may decrease other agents’ utilities,
without taking this into account. From a standard interpre-
tation in terms of Pigouvian tax [15], one expects that α = 1
is necessary to reach the optimal state, since by definition
this value internalizes all the externalities the agent causes to
the others when moving. Our results show that the optimal
state is maintained until much lower tax values (for example,
αc = 1/3 at m = 0), a surprising result which deserves further
analysis. Another interesting effect is observed for m > 2/3
(Figure 3). Introducing a small tax has no effect on the overall
satisfaction, the utility remaining constant until a threshold
level is attained at αt = (3m− 2)/(6− 5m).
We focused up to now on the zero temperature limit. For
low temperatures, the main qualitative conclusions are not
modified, as the phase diagram is modified only for extremal
values of ρ0 by entropic contributions. At higher temperatures
the city tends to become homogeneous, as the effect of ”noise”
(i.e., of the features that are not described in the model) dom-
inates over the utility associated to density of the blocks (see
Fig. 4).
Link to Schelling’s original segregation model
There are two main differences between our simple model and
Schelling’s original model [9] : the existence of agents of two
colors and the definition of the agents’ neighborhoods. We
now show that these additional features do not introduce any
essential effect.
Let us start by introducing agents of two ”colors” (such as
red and green). Simple calculations show that for two species
which only care about the density of neighbors of their own
color, the block potential (eq. 6) becomes :
f(ρR, ρG) = −TρR ln ρR − TρG ln ρG
− T (1− ρR − ρG) ln(1− ρR − ρG)
+ α
h
ρR uR(ρR) + ρG uG(ρG)
i
+ (1− α)
h Z ρR
0
uR(ρ
′)dρ′ +
Z ρG
0
uG(ρ
′)dρ′
i
with straightforward notations (for example uR(ρR) repre-
sents the utility of a red agent in a block with a density ρR of
red agents).
Finding the equilibrium configurations amounts to find-
ing the set {ρqR, ρqG} which maximizes the potential F (x) =
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P
q f(ρqR, ρqG) with the constraints
P
q ρqR = Qρ0R andP
q ρqG = Qρ0G, where ρ0G and ρ0R represent respectively
the overall concentration of green and red agents.
Because of the spatial constraints (the densities of red and
green agents in each block q must verify ρqR + ρqG ≤ 1), the
‘two populations’ model cannot formally be reduced to two in-
dependent ‘one population’ models. However, the stationary
states can still be computed. Let us focus once again on the
T → 0 limit and suppose for example that ρ0R = ρ0G = ρ0/2.
The stationary states depend once again on the values of ρ0,
m and α. For low values of α, it can be shown that the sys-
tem settles in a segregated state where each block contains
only one kind of agent with a density ρ0 (see Figure 5a). For
α ≥ αc, the system settles in a mixed state where the density
of a group in a block is either 0 or 1/2 (Figure 5b).
We now turn to the difference in agent’s neighborhoods.
In Schelling’s original model, agents’ neighbors are defined as
their 8 nearest neighbors. Our model considers instead prede-
fined blocks of common neighbors. First, it should be noted
that there is no decisive argument in favor of either neigh-
borhood definition in terms of the realism of the description
of real social neighborhoods. Second, we note that intro-
ducing blocks allows for an analytical solution for arbitrary
utility functions. This contrasts with the nearest neighbor
case, where the best analytical approach solves only a modi-
fied model which abandons the individual point of view and
is limited to a specific utility function [16]. Finally, the simu-
lations presented on Figures 5 show that the transition from
segregated to mixed states is not affected by the choice of
the neighborhood’s definition. We conclude that the block
description is more adapted to this kind of simple modelling,
which aims at showing stylized facts as segregation transitions.
Conclusion
Our simple model raises a number of interesting questions
about collective or individual points of view. In the purely
collective case (α = 1), the stationary state corresponds to
the maximization of the average utility, in analogy to the min-
imization of energy in physics. In the opposite case (α = 0),
the stationary state strongly differs from the simple collection
of individual optima [17]: the optimization strategy based
on purely individual dynamics fails, illustrating the unex-
pected links between micromotives and macrobehavior [18].
However, the emergent collective state can be efficiently cap-
tured by the maximization of the linking function `(ρ) given
in Eq. (5), up to constraints in the overall town density. This
function intimately connects the individual and global points
of view. First, it depends only on the global town configura-
tion (given by the ρq), allowing a relatively simple calculation
of the equilibrium. At the same time, it can be interpreted as
the sum of the individual marginal utilities gained by agents
as they progressively fill the city after leaving a reservoir of
zero utility. In the stationary state, a maximal value of the
potential L is reached. This means that no agent can increase
its utility by moving (since ∆u = ∆L), consistently with the
economists’ definition of a Nash equilibrium.
Equilibrium statistical mechanics has developed powerful
tools to link the microscopic and macroscopic levels. These
tools are limited to physical systems, where dynamics is gov-
erned by a global quantity such as the total energy. By intro-
ducing a link function, analogous to state functions in ther-
modynamics or potential functions in game theory [19], we
have extended the framework of statistical mechanics to a
Schelling-like model. Such an approach paves the way to an-
alytical treatments of a much wider class of systems, where
dynamics is governed by individual strategies.
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Fig. 1. Configurations of a city composed of Q = 36 blocks containing each H = 100
cells, with ρ0 = 1/2. (a) Mixed state. Stationary state of the city for m = 0.5,
α = 1 and T → 0. Agents are distributed homogeneously between the blocks, each of them
having a density of 0.5. (b) Segregated configuration. Stationary state of the city for
m = 0.5, α = 0 and T → 0. Agents are gathered on 20 blocks of mean density 0.9,
the other blocks being empty. In the original Schelling model [9], each agent has a distinct
neighborhood, defined by its 8 nearest neighbors. Here, we only keep the essential ingredient
of blocks of distinct densities. Our model shows the same qualitative behavior as Schelling’s
but can be solved exactly, thanks to the partial reduction of agent’s heterogeneity.
Fig. 2. Asymmetrically peaked individual utility as a function of block density. The utility is
defined as u(ρ) = 2ρ if ρ ≤ 1/2 and u(ρ) = m+2(1−m)(1− ρ) if ρ > 1/2, where
0 < m < 1 is the asymmetry parameter. Agents strictly prefer half-filled neighborhoods
(ρ = 1/2). They also prefer overcrowded (ρ = 1) neighborhoods to empty ones (ρ = 0).
Fig. 3. Phase diagram of the global utility as a function of the cooperativity α and the
asymmetry m, at T → 0 and ρ0 = 1/2. The average utility per agent U∗ = U/(Hρ0)
is calculated by maximizing the potential F (x) for the peaked utility shown in Fig. 2. The
plateau at high values of α corresponds to the mixed phase of optimal utility, which is separated
from the segregated state by a phase transition arising at αc = 1/(3 − 2m). The overall
picture is qualitatively unchanged for low but finite values of the temperature.
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Fig. 4. Phase diagrams for the asymmetrically peaked individual utility (Fig. 2, with m =
0.8) for different values of T . Increasing the temperature T tends to favor homogeneous states
(white regions labelled ”H”) over segregated phases (grey regions labelled ”S”). For small but
finite temperatures (roughly T < 0.2), the phase diagram is modified only for extremal values
of ρ0, as expected from the entropic term Ts(ρ) = −Tρ ln ρ−T (1−ρ) ln(1−ρ). As T
is increased, the whole diagram is affected by the entropic term. Compared to the T = 0 case,
the main change is the appearance of a second homogeneous phase for ρ0 < 1/2. But while
for ρ0 > 1/2 homogeneity corresponds to the optimal choice for the agents, for ρ0 < 1/2,
collective utility is not maximized in a homogeneous city. The city is homogeneous by noise,
not by choice.
Fig. 5. The transition from segregated to mixed states is not affected by the choice of the
neighborhood’s definition. The figures represent stationary configurations obtained by simulat-
ing a city containing an equal number of red and green agents, whose utilities are given by the
asymmetrically peaked utility function shown in Fig. 2 (m = 0.5). Top panel. The city
is divided into blocks of size H = 100. As predicted by the analytic model, a segregated
configuration is obtained for α = 0 (a) and a mixed configuration for α = 1 (b). Bottom
panel. The utility of an agent depends on the local density of similar neighbors computed on
the H = 108 nearest cells. The observed phases are identical to those obtained with the block
description : a segregated configuration for α = 0 (c) and a homogeneous configuration for
α = 1 (d). In all the simulations, we fix the proportion of vacant cells (in white) to 10% and
the temperature to 0.1. This small amount of noise does not change significantly the nature
of the stationary states compared to the case T → 0, but reduces the simulation convergence
time.
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